M.J. said:
is useless, uncertain, and painful. And were it true, we
do not think all Philosophy is worth one hour of pain.
80. How comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a fool does?
Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas a fool
declares
that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should feel pity and
not
anger.
Epictetus asks still more strongly: "Why are we not angry if we are told
that we have a headache, and why are we angry if we are told that we
reason
badly, or choose wrongly"? The reason is that we are quite certain that we
have not a headache, or are not lame, but we are not so sure that we make
a
true choice. So, having assurance only because we see with our whole
sight,
it puts us into suspense and surprise when another with his whole sight
sees
the opposite, and still more so when a thousand others deride our choice.
For we must prefer our own lights to those of so many others, and that is
bold and difficult. There is never this contradiction in the feelings
towards a cripple.
81. It is natural for the mind to believe and for the will to love; so
that,
for want of true objects, they must attach themselves to false.
82. Imagination.--It is that deceitful part in man, that mistress of error
and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not always so; for she would
be
an infallible rule of truth, if she were an infallible rule of falsehood.
But being most generally false, she gives no sign of her nature,
impressing
the same character on the true and the false.
I do not speak of fools, I speak of the wisest men; and it is among them
that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion. Reason protests in
vain; it cannot set a true value on things.
This arrogant power, the enemy o
